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UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CONDITIONS: THE

SECOND CIRCUIT SPLITS WITH THE

D.C.

CIRCUIT AND ERRONEOUSLY

FINDS ANTI-PROSTITUTION
PLEDGE REQUIRED

FOR

HIV/AIDS

FUNDING UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Cole Davis*

N Alliance for Open Society International,Inc. v. U.S. Agency for International Development (AOSI v. USAID), a divided panel of the
Second Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of a policy requirement in the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act).1
The majority held that requiring non-governmental organization (NGO)
grantees to adopt the government's anti-prostitution pledge as a condition of funding "falls well beyond what the Supreme Court and this Court
have upheld as permissible funding conditions," thus violating the grantees' First Amendment rights. 2 In doing so, the majority improperly
blended a combination of First Amendment legal doctrines to reach its
desired, policy-driven result, and, as noted by a vigorous dissent, created
a circuit split with the D.C. Circuit's decision in DKT International,Inc. v.
U.S. Agency for International3Development over the constitutionality of
the same pledge requirement.
In 2003, Congress passed the Leadership Act to strengthen the U.S.
response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria pandemics, and
through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), provides $48 billion of funding for the development of vaccines and public-private partnerships with NGOs. 4 As a result of a congressional
finding that "[t]he sex industry, the trafficking of individuals into such
industry, and sexual violence are additional causes of and factors in the
* J.D. Candidate 2013, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.B.A. 2006, magna cum
laude, Texas Christian University.
1. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 651 F.3d 218,
223-24 (2d Cir. 2011); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2008).
2. Alliance for Open Soc'y, 651 F.3d at 234.
3. Id. at 267 (Straub, J. dissenting); see also DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l
Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
4. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7603, 7671(a) (2008).
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spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic,"' 5 Congress included a policy requirement that "[n]o funds made available to carry out this [Act] ... may be
used to provide assistance to any group or organization that does
not
'6
have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking."
The plaintiffs in AOSI v. USAID were NGOs involved in the fight
against AIDS and received funding from both the Leadership Act and
private sources. 7 Although none of the plaintiffs supported prostitution,
"their work d[id] involve engaging, educating, and assisting [high-risk]
groups, such as prostitutes, that are vulnerable to HIV/AIDS." 8 The
NGOs sued USAID on the ground that the affirmative policy requirement violated their First Amendment rights by compelling them to speak
the government's viewpoint, which forced them to stigmatize and drive
underground the very demographic they aimed to educate about risks
and best practices within the sex industry. 9
As a basis for granting preliminary injunctive relief, the district court
reasoned that under the Supreme Court's unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence, the funding condition impaired the plaintiffs' First Amendment protected activity, was not narrowly tailored to survive a heightened
scrutiny review, and did not allow for adequate alternative channels of
communication.1 0 During the first appeal, USAID promulgated regulations allowing grantees to establish separate affiliates to use private funding free from the Act's policy requirement, 1 thus giving the NGOs an
alternative channel for speech and supposedly curing the constitutional
defect. 12 On remand from the Second Circuit, the district court again
granted a preliminary injunction because it found that, "[w]hile the
Guidelines may or may not provide an adequate alternate channel for
Plaintiffs to express their views regarding prostitution, the clause requiring Plaintiffs to adopt the Government's view regarding ... prostitution
'13
remains intact.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."' 14 The Supreme Court has recognized
that the right to freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking.1 5 However, the Spending Clause
5. Id. § 7601(23).
6. Id. § 7631(f).
7. Alliance for Open Soc'y, 651 F.3d at 223-25.

8. Id. at 224.
9. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d
222, 243, 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
10. Id. at 258-59.
11. Guidance Regarding Section 301(f) of the United States Leadership Against HIV/
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 [22 U.S.C. § 7631(f)], 72 Fed. Reg. 41,076,
41,076-77 (Dep't of Health & Human Servs. July 26, 2007).
12. See Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 223-24 (2d
Cir. 2006).
13. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 570 F. Supp. 2d
533, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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of the Constitution gives Congress broad power to tax and spend for the
general welfare of the United States, 16 and the Supreme Court has long
recognized that Congress may attach conditions to the receipt of federal
funds. 17 While the government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible if direct regulation of speech
or a criminal penalty were at stake, 18 the unconstitutional conditions doctrine mandates that the government "'may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . .freedom of

speech even if he has no entitlement to that benefit." ' 19 In AOSI v.
USAID, the Second Circuit held the affirmative anti-prostitution pledge
required for Leadership Act funding was an unconstitutional condition
20
that infringed upon the NGOs' First Amendment rights.
The majority began its analysis by synthesizing three seminal Supreme
Court unconstitutional conditions cases: Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, FCC v. League of Women Voters of California,
and Rust v. Sullivan.21 Taxation upheld a statute that denied tax deductions to Section 501(c)(3) organizations engaged in "substantial lobbying," a First Amendment protected activity. 22 Because the statute
allowed for the creation of separate, tax-exempt Section 501(c)(4) affiliates to lobby with non-federal funds, Taxation with Representation's First
Amendment rights were not violated, as Congress simply chose not to
pay for its lobbying activity. 23 In League of Women Voters, a funding
condition that prohibited a public radio station from editorializing, even
through wholly private funds, was held unconstitutional because there
was no option to establish a separate entity to speak freely outside of the
government-funded program. 24 Finally, Rust held that when restrictions
are placed on a government program, such as funding family planning
programs that do not involve abortions, as opposed to the recipient
healthcare provider, and the recipient is still able to voice its opinion
outside the scope of the program, Congress is allowed to "fund one activity to the exclusion of the other. ' 25 The majority summed up the unconstitutional conditions doctrine with a prior Second Circuit case,
Velazquez v. Legal Services Corp., in which it held that "in appropriate
circumstances, Congress may burden the First Amendment rights of recipients of government benefits if the recipients are left with adequate
16. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
17. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
18. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587-88 (1998).
19. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59
(2006) (quoting united States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003)).
20. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 651 F.3d 218,
223-24 (2d Cir. 2011).
21. See id. at 231 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
22. Taxation, 461 U.S. at 542, 551.
23. Id. at 545-46.
24. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400.
25. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
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alternative channels for protected expression. '2 6
The majority then turned to a trio of Supreme Court cases involving
compelled speech, in which an individual is required to affirmatively
adopt the government's point of view or face a monetary penalty or the
loss of preexisting benefits: Wooley v. Maynard, Speiser v. Randall, and
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.2 7 In Wooley, the
Court held that a statute requiring drivers to display the New Hampshire
state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates violated the First
Amendment by forcing the drivers to adopt the government's point of
view.2 8 In Speiser, the Court held unconstitutional a California law that
conditioned a veteran's right to receive a property tax exemption on signing an oath stating he did not advocate the violent overthrow of the government. 29 Finally, in Barnette the Court held that requiring children to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance in class was an unconstitutional infringement on their First Amendment rights to refrain from speaking. 30 The
majority next discussed the "government speech" doctrine of Rust, which
says that the government may impose "viewpoint-based" restrictions only
when it is the speaker or it has hired "'private speakers to transmit information"' about the government's own program, 31 and conceded that according to the Supreme Court in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, the government "'may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by
the grantee"' when it "'disburses public funds ... to convey a governmental message."' 32 However, the majority claimed that in this case, the
Leadership Act's purpose of fighting HIV/AIDS cannot now be recast as
an anti-prostitution messaging campaign, which would allow the govern33
ment to impose its anti-prostitution views through private speakers.
Combining the unconstitutional conditions, compelled speech, and government speech doctrines, the majority asserted that "[it is this bold
combination . . . of a speech-targeted restriction that is both affirmative
and quintessentially viewpoint-based that warrants heightened scrutiny."'34 The majority concluded by rejecting the curative function of an
"adequate alternative channel," which saved the statutes in Rust and Taxin privately
ation, because here it merely "afford[ed] an outlet to engage
35
funded silence" while the affirmative pledge remained.
26. Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F.3d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1999).
27. See Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 651 F.3d 218,
234 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
28. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706-07, 717.
29. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 514-15, 519.
30. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
31. Alliance for Open Soc'y, 651 F.3d at 236 (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001)).
32. Id. at 237 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995)).
33. Id. at 237-38.
34. Id. at 236.
35. Id. at 239.
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In a lengthy and persuasive dissent, Judge Straub dissected the flaws in
the majority's argument and concluded that the policy requirement is not
subject to heightened scrutiny and is a rational exercise of Congress's
Spending Clause power. 36 His main contention with the majority was
that when the government does not directly regulate speech, but instead
implicates First Amendment issues through conditions on federal spending, the only doctrine applicable is the unconstitutional conditions doctrine seen in Taxation, League of Women Voters, Speiser, and Rust-and
none of those cases "turned on whether the alleged speech restriction was
affirmative or negative. ' 37 He grouped relevant unconstitutional conditions cases into two categories in which a First Amendment violation occurs: (1) those where the funding condition operates as a penalty on free
speech, and (2) those that are aimed to suppress certain viewpoints. 38 As
for the "penalty" category, he synthesized Taxation, League of Women
Voters, and Rust to say that Congress is free to limit funding recipients'
First Amendment rights if the conditions "do not limit free speech
outside of the scope of the government program," "do not deny independent benefits to which recipients are otherwise entitled," and "are meant
only to ensure that government funds are used for the purposes for which
they were authorized. '39 Judge Straub concluded that the Leadership
Act's pledge requirement does not violate any of these principles because
the NGOs are able to form affiliates to use private funds free of the
pledge requirement; the funding condition is not a preexisting benefit to
which the NGOs are already constitutionally entitled; and the anti-prostitution stance is central to the Leadership Act's authorized 4purpose
to
0
partner with like-minded private entities to fight HIV/AIDS.
As for the "viewpoint suppression" category, he noted how Rust allows
Congress to fund one activity to the exclusion of another without invidiously discriminating. 4 1 Further, Judge Straub engaged in a much more
thorough analysis than the majority to conclude that viewpoint discrimination should give rise to strict scrutiny only if the funding condition (a)
is "'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas," 42 (b) "encourage[s] a
diversity of views" in areas normally open to the public or creates a
"quasi-public forum," and then censors one viewpoint, 43 or (c) facilitates
private speech and then censors the content. 4 4 Judge Straub then made
clear that Congress did not intend to suppress pro-prostitution views by
36. Id. at 240 (Straub, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 240, 255-57 (Straub, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 246 (Straub, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 246, 248 (Straub, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 258-59, 262 (Straub, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 246, 249 (Straub, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 261 (Straub, J., dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519
(1958)).
43. Id. (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
44. See id. at 262 (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531
U.S. 533, 542 (2001)).
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funding select NGOs in the fight against HIV/AIDS, and certainly did
various stances
not try to encourage a diversity of views from NGOs with
45
on prostitution and then censor a particular viewpoint.
The majority's holding was erroneous because it improperly blended
several doctrines to create the court's own version of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine; disregarded the safety provision that allows NGOs to
establish subsidiaries to accept federal funds subject to the pledge but
leaves the parent organization free to speak its own views on prostitution;
and overemphasized the affirmative nature of the pledge requirement.
As the dissent pointed out, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as
applied in a federal funding situation has a direct line of Supreme Court
precedent from Speiser to Taxation and its progeny. 46 Instead of following these decisions, the majority resorted to importing a heightened standard of review from compelled speech cases like Wooley and Barnette, in
which the government directly infringed upon a person's First Amendment rights, rather than analyzing this Spending Clause case under a
traditional rational basis review. While Speiser's unconstitutional affirmative pledge not to overthrow the government appears similar to the
Leadership Act's pledge to oppose prostitution, it must be noted that the
Speiser pledge was wholly unrelated to the underlying property tax exemption benefit, whereas the anti-prostitution pledge is central to Congress's purpose in creating the Leadership Act. 47 Additionally, even if
the majority's hybrid unconstitutional conditions doctrine is applied, the
recipients are free to form subsidiaries to accept the funds and adopt the
anti-prostitution pledge, while at the same time the parent organization
may maintain its neutral or even pro-prostitution views. The Act's guidelines are the same as those that saved the restrictions in Rust and Regan.
As the dissent emphasized, none of the "true" unconstitutional conditions cases turned on a distinction between a negative restraint on speech
and an affirmative requirement to speak. The majority blended doctrines
involving viewpoint-based discrimination and compelled speech in order
to conclude that it is the combination of all these doctrines that "pushes
considerably further" than the restrictions in Taxation ("lobbying"),
League of Women Voters ("editorializing"), and Rust ("abortion-related
speech"). 48 However, the majority conceded that the government would
be entitled to require funding recipients of a "Just Say No" to drugs campaign to state that they oppose drug use by children, which is both view49
point-based and affirmative.
By upholding the preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit arguably
decided the case correctly from a human rights perspective, considering
45. Id. at 263 (Straub, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 255-57 (Straub, J., dissenting).
47. See 22 U.S.C. § 7601(23) (2008).
48. Alliance for Open Soc'y, 651 F.3d at 234.

49. See id. at 237-38.
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recommended best practices and empirical data. 50 However, at the same
time it did little to clarify the "blurred and shifting line" between Con51
gress's Spending Clause authority and an unconstitutional condition.
Moreover, it has created a circuit split with the D.C. Circuit, which found
that compelled speech cases were inapplicable to an unconstitutional conditions analysis and that Leadership Act recipients were free to establish
affiliates to keep restricted public funds and unrestricted private funds
52
separate, the so-called adequate alternative channel for free speech.
In AOSI v. USAID, the Second Circuit improperly held that the affirmative anti-prostitution pledge required for funding under the Leadership
Act was an unconstitutional condition infringing upon the NGOs' protected speech. Instead of determining whether Congress had a rational
basis for including the policy requirement, the majority enjoined its enforcement by unnecessarily requiring a compelling interest under a
heightened standard of review. Indeed, as Judge Straub concluded in his
dissent, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a "'troubled area of
[Supreme Court] jurisprudence,' and ....the Supreme Court may wish to
'53
grant certiorari to set us straight.

50. See, e.g., Erica Tracy Kagan, Note, Morality v. Reality: The Struggle to Effectively
Fight HIVIA IDS and Respect Human Rights, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1201, 1212-25 (2007).
51. Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d
222, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
52. DKT Int'l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 763-64 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
53. Alliance for Open Soc'y, 651 F.3d at 268 (Straub, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991)).
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